



The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 - better known as Gramm-
Rudman··Hollings - has increased the scrutiny
of deficit projections. Under the procedures
established by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, both
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the
Office ofManagement and Budget (OMB) are
required to project the deficit implications of
each year's fiscal budget to determine whether
the deficit will remain below the ceilings estab-
lished by the legislation. If the CBO and OMB
conclude the deficit will exceed the ceiling,
spending would need to be cut.
Recently, large revisions in the projections of
current and future federal budget deficits have
called attention to the limitations ofthe deficit
projection process and raised questions about
relying too strongly on such projections in politi-
cal decisionmaking.
The CBO currently is projecting a budget deficit
for fiscal year 1989 that is $120 biIIion lower
than what it projected just a year ago. In this
Letter, we examine some of the reasons for the
large changes in the projections offuture defi-
cits. A study ofthese recent revisions and actual
experience suggests that projections should not
be interpreted as forecasts of actual deficits. Pro-
jections are conditioned by assumptions about
government policy and the economy. As a
result, they may differ markedly from the deficits
that subsequently occur.
Recent revisions
To illustrate the dramatic change that has
recently occurred in the projections offuture
deficits, Chart 1 shows the CBO's baseline bud-
get projections reported each February in 1984,
1985, and 1986 for the budget years 1986 to
1990. In February 1984, the CBO projected a
federal deficit for fiscal year 1989 of $308 bil-
lion. One year later, in February 1985, CBO had
cut its projected 1989 deficit by 9 percent to
$280 billion. Then, in February 1986, the CBO
slashed its projected 1989 deficit in halfto $144
billion.
Another perspective on deficit projections .is
given by Chart 2 which shows the actual deficits
for 1982 to 1985, together with the OMB's pro-
jections ofthe deficit one year and two years
earlier. The actual deficit for fiscal year 1982, for
example, was $128 billion, while two years ear-
lier (in 1980), the OMB had projected a deficit
of only $46 billion for 1982. An ensuing reces-
sion caused the actual deficit to increase sub-
stantially from that projected.
Sources of revisions
Revisions in projected future deficits arise from
two sources. First, they come from differences
between actual government actions and those
assumed when the projections were made. Defi-
cit projections depend on assumptions about the
spending and tax programs that Congress will
approve. Ifthese assumption~ turn out to be
wrong, the deficit projections would have to be
revised.
Second, revisions come from changes in eco-
nomic forecasts. Any projection offuture deficits
must be based on an underlying set of assump-
tions about economic growth, inflation, and
interest rates, for example, all ofwhich are sub-
ject to change. Both these sources of revisions
have been important in the recent dramatic
change in the outlook for future deficits.
The CBO's projection for fiscal year 1989
provides a good example of how both policy
changes and changes in economic forecasts
affect budget projections. This FebruarY,the
CBO cut its projected deficit for 1989 to $144
billion, from the $280 billion projection it made
in February 1985. A major reason for this down-
ward revision was a $73 billion reduction in
estimated defense spending in 1989. Last Febru-
ary, the CBO assumed that growth in defense
budget authority, adjusted for inflation, would
average almost 6 percent from 1986 through
1990. However, in 1985, Congress froze infla-
tion-adjusteddefense spending for the 1986 fis-
cal year and reduced planned growth for future
years. Consequently, the CBO nowassumesFRBSF
there will be no growth in defense spending for
the next five years.
A second major cause ofthe CBO's recent revi-
sions in deficit projections was a change in the
assumed path of interest rates. The CBO based
its February 1985 budget prajections on the
assumption that the interest rate on three-month
Treasury bills would average over 8 percentin
1986, and remain over 8 percent through 1989.
In contrast, it based its February 1986 projec-
tions on the assumption that the three-month biII
rate would fall to about.6 percent by 1989.
The downwardrevision in the pattern offuture
interest rates reduced future interest payments
and thereby led to smaller projected deficits.
Smaller deficits and lower borrowingfurther
reduced projected interest payments in future
years. Together, the revised assumptions about
defensespending and the cumulative effect of
interestpayments reduced theprojected deficit
for 1989 by $123billion.
Because assumptions aboutthe future play such
an important role in determining deficit projec-
tions, new information about the economyor
about Congressional budget actions can quickly
make projections obsolete. Since theCBOpro-
jections were published in February, interest
rates have declined further andoil prices have
dropped dramatically. For example, the rate on
the three-month Treasury billhasfallen from
7.00 percent in early February to the current
level ofapproximately 5.75 percent. Market
prices for oil have declined about 35 percent
from February levels. To the extent that these
economic developments persist, theywililower
projected future deficits even further.
Administration forecasts
The impact of alternative assumptions about
economicconditions and Congressional actions
on deficit projections is even more apparentin
comparisons ofprojections prepared by the
CBOandthoseprepared by theReagan Admin-
istration. The February CBO deficitprojection
for 1989is $144 billion whereas the Administra-
tion projec:ts a $68billion deficit __ $76billion
lower than CBO's. projection. Ofthis difference,
$23billion is due to differing assumptions about
the economy, giventhe Administration's budget,
while $53 billionreflects differing assumptions
about the budget Congress will pass.
CBO projections are based on the assumption
that the average growth rate of real GNP over
the next six years will be 3.3 percent. In con-
trast, the Administration is assuming an average
growth rate over this same period of 3.8 percent.
Even a difference as small as V2 percent per year
can have a sizable impact on the deficit outlook.
For example, the CBO estimates that an addi-
tional 1 percent real growth in 1986 would cut
$19 billion off the 1987 deficit; the effect of
higher economic growth on the resulting deficit
is even larger in future years.
Differing assumptions about interest rates con-
stitute another reason the CBO is projecting
much higher deficits than the Administration. In
February, the CBO assumed that the three-
month Treasury bill rate would decline gradually
over the next five years and average 6.1 percent
in 1989. It assumed the ten-year government
bond rate would fall over the same period to 7.5
percent. The Administration, in contrast,
assumed that these two key interest rates would
decline more sharply - to 4.8 percent and 5.5
percent, respectively, by 1989. The lower inter-
est rate assumptions combine with higher real
growth assumptions to produce Administration
deficit projections that are $15 billion lower in
1987, $23 billion lower in 1989, and $40 billion
lower in 1991 than.those the CBO projects
would result from the Administration's budget.
Assumptions about Congressional action also
play important roles in explaining differences
between the CBO and Reagan Administration
deficit projections. While the CBO assumes that
appropriations and tax laws will remain
unchanged, the Administration assumes that all
of its legislative proposals will be approved by
Congress. Hence, even if both the CBO and the
Administration employed the same economic
assumptions, they would arrive at different esti-
matesofthe deficit. For example, while CBO
projects a $144 billion deficit for 1989, the
Administration budget, adjusted to reflect the
CBO's assumptions about the economy, shows a
1989 deficit ofonly $91 billion. The Administra-
tion projection thus incorporates the assumption
that policy actions will cut $53 billion from the
deficit by 1989.
Even for 1987, the impact of alternative assump-
tions about policy action is substantial. Under
CBO's economic assumptions, the Administra-Chart 1
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tion's projection of a $160 billion deficit incor-
porates proposed policy changes thatamount to
a deficit $20 billion lower than what the CBO
projects. The proposed policy changes incorpo-
rated into the Administration's projections affect
both budget outlays and revenues. For example,
the Administration anticipates an additional $20
billion in revenue over the 1987-1991 period
from staffing decisions that strengthen the Inter-
nal Revenue Service among other actions, and
savings of $46 billion in reduced Medicare and
Medicaid expenditures.
Conclusion
The federal deficit depends on developments in
the national economy and on Congressional
actions, neither ofwhich can be projected with-
out making specific assumptions about the
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future. Thus, it is not surprising that large revi-
sions in projected future deficits occur from one
year to the next. Nor is it surprising that projec-
tions prepared by different agencies can differ
greatly. As long as the behaviorof both the
economy and Congress is unpredictable, the
deficit also will be unpredictable.
In other words, projections of deficits several
years ahead must be viewed as conditioned by
assumptions that mayor may not be confirmed
by the actual turn ofevents. While deficit pro-
jections prepared by the CBO or OMB are often
interpreted outside these agencies as forecasts,
such interpretations are unwarranted.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investmentsl 2 200,765 - 168 7,803 4.0
Loans and Leases1 6 183,010 - 87 9,058 5.2
Commercial and Industrial 51,629 119 65 0.1
Real estate 66,726 39 3,089 4.8
Loans to Individuals 39,257 - 107 4,508 12.9
Leases 5,572 2 151 2.7
U.S. Treasury and Agency 5ecurities2 10,413 - 92 - 1,754 - 14.4
Other Securities2 7,342 12 497 7.2
Total Deposits 206,384 - 3,487 8,151 4.1
Demand Deposits 52,810 - 3,285 5,483 11.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 36,614 -14,836 4,771 14.9
OtherTransaction Balances4 16,629 155 2,647 18.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,945 - 358 22 0.0
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 47,087 - 9 2,388 5.3
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000 or more 35,256 - 338 - 2,488 - 6.5
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 22,218 - 535 - 376 - 1.6
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures














1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.5. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephonetransfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange